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The Self-Reference Effect on Perception: Undiminished in Adults with
Autism and No Relation to Autism Traits
David M. Williams , Toby Nicholson, and Catherine Grainger
Memory for (and perception of) information about the self is superior to memory for (and perception of) other kinds
of information. This self-reference effect (SRE) in memory appears diminished in ASD and related to the number of
ASD traits manifested by neurotypical individuals (fewer traits5 larger SRE). Here, we report the first experiments
exploring the relation between ASD and the SRE in perception. Using a “Shapes” Task (Sui et al., Journal of Experimen-
tal Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 38, 1105, 2012), participants learned to associate three different
shapes (triangle, circle, square) with three different labels representing self, a familiar other, or an unfamiliar other
(e.g., “you”, “mother”, “stranger”). Participants then completed trials during which they were presented with one
shape and one label for 100 ms, and made judgments about whether the shape and label was a match. In Experiment
1, neurotypical participants (n5124) showed the expected SRE, detecting self-related matches more reliably and
quickly than matches involving familiar or unfamiliar other. Most important, number of ASD traits was unrelated to
the size of the SRE for either accuracy or RT. Bayesian association analyses strongly supported the null hypothesis. In
Experiment 2, there were no differences between 22 adults with ASD and 21 matched comparison adults in perfor-
mance on the Shapes Task. Despite showing large and significant theory of mind impairments, participants with ASD
showed the typical SRE and there were no associations with ASD traits in either group. In every case, Bayesian analy-
ses favored the null hypothesis. These findings challenge theories about self-representation in ASD, as discussed in
the article. Autism Res 2018, 11: 331–341. VC 2017 The Authors Autism Research published by International Society
for Autism Research and Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
Lay Summary: Neurotypical people tend to find it easier to perceive and remember information that relates to
themselves than information that relates to others. Research suggests that people with ASD show a diminished (or
absent) self-bias in memory and that severity of ASD predicts the extent of this diminution (more severe ASD5 smaller
self-bias in memory). However, the current research suggests strongly that people with ASD do show a self-bias in
their perception. This research informs our understanding of psychological functioning in ASD and challenges theo-
ries regarding self-awareness in this disorder.
Keywords: autism spectrum disorder; self-reference effect; self-awareness; metacognition; mindreading; memory;
perception
Introduction
Definitions of self-awareness are numerous, throughout
the history of philosophy as well as psychology. One
particularly important distinction between subjective
and objective levels of self (the ‘I’ and ‘me’, respec-
tively) was drawn by James [1890]. On the one hand,
the self is an existential entity that experiences (the
“I”). It is the knower, the experiencer, and the agent of
activity. On the other hand, the self can be both known
and experienced (the “Me”). The self can be the object
of thought.
Regardless of the precise taxonomy of self that is
employed, it is widely agreed that the self plays an
important role in human cognition and perception,
exerting influence across a range of domains and situa-
tions [see Sui & Humphreys, 2015]. One of the clearest
empirical demonstrations of this influence is the so-
called “self-reference effect” [Rogers, Kuiper, & Kirker,
1977], whereby information encoded in relation to the
self has a mnemonic advantage over information
encoded in other ways. This effect is apparent in a
number of different paradigms and across different
domains of processing. For example, in the domain of
memory, when people are asked to make explicit yes/
no judgments about whether personality trait adjectives
(e.g., “loving”, “grumpy”, “emotional”) apply to them-
selves or to a familiar other person, subsequent memory
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is superior for those traits judged in relation to self
than those judged in relation to others [e.g., Klein &
Loftus, 1988; Symons & Johnson, 1997]. Likewise,
objects that belong to oneself (or are imagined to
belong to oneself) are more reliably recalled/recognized
than objects that belong to others (an “ownership
effect”); in an ownership paradigm, participants observe
objects being placed in two locations, and are told that
all the items in one location are “owned” by them and
all the items in the other location are “owned” by
another person. Subsequent memory is reliably superior
for self-owned than other-owned items [e.g., Cunning-
ham, Turk, MacDonald, & Macrae, 2017].
Self-reference affects not only memory, however, but
also perception. For example, Sui, He, and Humphreys
[2012] developed a task in which participants had to
make speeded perceptual judgments about whether
shape/label pairs matched a previously-learned contin-
gency. Specifically, participants first learned to associate
three simple shapes (triangle, circle, square) with three
simple labels that represented self, a familiar other, or
an unfamiliar other (e.g., “you”, “mother”, “stranger”).
Hence, circle might be associated with “you”, triangle
with “mother”, and square with “stranger”. After this
brief learning phase, participants completed a series of
trials on each of which they were presented with one
shape and one label for a short period (100 ms), and
made perceptual judgments about whether the shape
and label were a match for the learned contingency or
a mismatch. Sui et al. found that participants were
quicker and more accurate to perceive matches involv-
ing the self than they were to perceive matches involv-
ing either mother or stranger. Specifically, they found a
pattern of accuracy self>mother> stranger and a pat-
tern of response times (RTs) self<mother< stranger on
matching trials (but not mismatching trials). This effect,
which has been replicated several times [see Sui &
Humphreys, 2015], shows that self-representation influ-
ences perception, as well as memory. The importance
of studies, such as Sui et al.’s, is captured by Cunning-
ham and Turk [2017, pp. 992–993] when they argue
that, “‘New wave’ methodologies, such as Cunningham
et al.’s [2017] ownership paradigm and Sui et al.’s
[2012] shape association task, have allowed the explora-
tion of the self’s influence on cognition to move
beyond memory effects to a striking array of automatic
self-processing biases.”
The study of SREs is particularly important when it
comes to understanding cognitive processing in various
forms of psychopathology that are characterized by
atypical self-representation. If one’s self influences or
structures cognition, perception, and decision-making
in a fundamental way, then it follows that these facets
will be qualitatively different among people with
diminished/atypical self-representation. In this way, dif-
ficulties with some aspect of self-representation might
contribute to/underpin core features of a disorder. One
developmental disorder that is particularly important to
consider in this respect is autism spectrum disorder
(ASD).
Self-Reference Effects in ASD
Despite a wealth of research into social cognition and
awareness of others, in general, among people with
ASD, research into self-awareness in this disorder is rela-
tively sparse. Research into self-reference effects is
beginning to reveal key insights into the nature of self-
experience and self-representation in this disorder,
however. Three studies have converged on the finding
that individuals with ASD show a diminished SRE on
the traditional trait memory paradigm [Henderson
et al., 2009; Lombardo, Barnes, Wheelwright, & Baron-
Cohen, 2007; Toichi et al., 2002]. Moreover, Henderson
et al. found that the extent of this diminution was asso-
ciated significantly with the severity of ASD features
(more ASD traits5 smaller SRE). Likewise, Grisdale,
Lind, Eacott, and Williams [2014, Experiment 2] found
that the ownership effect was significantly diminished
in adults with ASD, relative to that observed in age-,
IQ-, and sex-matched comparison participants. More-
over, Grisdale et al. (Exp. 1) also found that individual
differences in the number of ASD traits displayed by a
group of neurotypical individuals was associated signifi-
cantly with the size of the ownership effect, confirming
a link between difficulties with social functioning and
self-representation.The usual explanation for these
diminished self-biases in ASD is that people with this
disorder have an atypical or impoverished self-
representation, which does not therefore act as an orga-
nizational structure to shape encoding of information
[see Lind, 2010]. However, an alternative explanation
for these findings is that self-representation is unim-
paired in ASD, but somehow ‘‘blocked’’ from influenc-
ing memory [because of atypical connectivity between
those brain regions underpinning self-representation
and those underpinning memory; see Grisdale et al.,
2014]. If this alternative explanation is correct, then
people with ASD might well show a typical self-bias in
a domain other than memory. Such a finding would be
important for our understanding not only of self-
awareness in ASD, but also psychological functioning
more generally in this disorder. As noted above, the
importance of self-awareness for cognition, perception,
and decision-making is increasingly recognized by psy-
chologists, cognitive neuroscientists, and philosophers,
so understanding these facets goes hand-in hand with
understanding self-awareness.1
1Studies of self-referencing have also found that neurotypical individ-
uals show a positivity bias, endorsing more positive traits about them-
selves than negative traits [e.g., Pfeifer et al., 2013], but that this bias is
also diminished in ASD [Burrows et al., 2017].
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Given the importance of this issue, we investigated it
in the current study using one of the “new wave” meth-
odologies that have moved the field on from investigat-
ing the effect of self-reference on memory. Here, we
employed the Sui et al. [2012] Shapes Task to investigate
for the first time the influence of self-representation on
perceptual binding. In Experiment 1, we adopted an indi-
vidual differences approach to establish whether the size
of the self-bias on the Shapes Task (i.e., the extent of the
accuracy and RT advantage for self-related matches over
other-related matches) was associated with the number of
ASD traits [as measured using the Autism-spectrum Quo-
tient; Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, Raste, & Plumb,
2001] reported by 124 neurotypical individuals.
Given that ASD features are likely to be distributed con-
tinuously throughout the general population [e.g., Frazier
et al., 2014], studying individual differences in ASD traits
and their relation to psychological abilities in the neuro-
typical population can make an important contribution
to our understanding of ASD itself. However, there can
still be qualitative differences in the mechanisms/pro-
cesses that underpin those traits in each population [e.g.,
Peterson, Wellman, & Liu, 2005; Mandy et al., 2012]. As
such, a full understanding requires the study of diagnosed
cases, as well as traits in the neurotypical population.
Therefore, in Experiment 2, the Shapes Task (as well as
the autism-spectrum quotient and two measures of mind-
reading) was completed by 22 adults with ASD and 21
age-, IQ-, and sex-matched comparison participants.
Experiment 1: Method
Participants
124 students (104 female) from the University of Kent
took part in Experiment 1. The average age of participants
was 20.02 years (SD53.22) years. No participant had a
history of ASD, according to self-report. All participants
gave informed consent and received course credit in par-
tial fulfillment of their degree, for taking part in the
study. The experiment was ethically approved by XXX
Psychology Research Ethics Committee.
Materials and Procedures
Shapes Task [Sui et al., 2012]. Following, participants
were first instructed to associate a shape (triangle,
square, or circle) to a person label, which could either
relate to themselves (“you”), a familiar other
(“mother”) or an unfamiliar other (“stranger”). Each
shape was associated with a different label (e.g.,
you5 circle, mother5 triangle, or stranger5 square)
and these associations were labeled matches, any alter-
native combinations were labeled mismatches. The task
was to judge if the presented shape and person label
was a match or a mismatch.
In each trial, following a white fixation cross dis-
played centrally for 500 ms one of the three possible
geometric shapes (triangle, square, or circle) was pre-
sented centrally above one of the three possible person
labels (you, mother or stranger) for 100 ms (see Fig. 1).
Participants were then given a variable response win-
dow (between 800 and 1200 ms, randomized across tri-
als) to press one of two possible keys, “c” if they judged
the combination a match and “m” if they judged it a
mismatch. Response feedback followed every trial
informing participants of their accuracy. Each partici-
pant performed a minimum of 12 training trials prior
to 3 blocks of 120 experimental trials. Match and mis-
match trials occurred an equal number of times for
each person label and the trial order was pseudo-
randomized and presented in a fixed order. Each
Figure 1. Example of a (correct) trial in the Shapes Task.
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participant performed one of six versions (counterbal-
anced across participants) of the task representing each
possible shape and person label combination.
The primary dependent measures for the Shapes Task
were task accuracy and reaction time (RT). Accuracy for
matches was calculated as the proportion of correct
responses on match trials for each person label. Like-
wise, accuracy for mismatches was calculated as the
proportion of correct responses on mismatch trials for
each person label. We employed accuracy as a DV,
rather than another commonly used measure, namely
d’. This was because our focus was on the self-bias for
matching judgments specifically (and d’ incorporates
variance associated with mismatching judgments, as
well as matching judgments). However, when d’ was
employed as the DV in supplementary analyses, the
results were substantively identical to when accuracy
was employed (see footnotes X and Y).
We also calculated a self-bias score for matching
judgments by subtracting the average combined accu-
racy for matching judgments about mother and
stranger from the average accuracy for matching judg-
ments about self (you). The larger the resulting value,
the greater the self-bias in accuracy for matching judg-
ments. An equivalent self-bias score was created for
mismatching judgments also. We also calculated a
self-bias score for response times on trials in the same
manner (combined average RTs of mother and stranger
minus you).2
Autism-spectrum Quotient (AQ). The AQ is used
widely, and is a valid and reliable measure of ASD traits
in people with a full diagnosis and in the general popu-
lation. Participants read statements (e.g., “I find social
situations easy”; “I find myself drawn more strongly to
people than to things”) and decide the extent to which
each statement applies to them, responding on a 4-
point Likert scale, ranging from “definitely agree” to
“definitely disagree”. Scores range from 0 to 50, with
higher scores indicating more ASD traits.
Bayesian Analyses
Bayesian analyses provide an estimation of the relative
strength of a finding for one hypothesis over another
(i.e., the alternative hypothesis over the null, or vice
versa), which allows a more graded interpretation of
the data than is possible using P values or effect sizes
alone [e.g., Dienes, 2014; Rouder, Speckman, Sun,
Morey, & Iverson, 2009]. Therefore, we included Bayes-
ian analyses, interpreting results according to Jeffreys
[1961] criteria: Bayes factors (BF10)>3 provide firm evi-
dence for the alternative hypothesis (with val-
ues>10,>30, and >100 providing strong, very strong,
and decisive evidence, respectively) and values under 1
provide evidence for the null (with values<0.33 pro-
viding firm evidence). Bayesian analyses were con-
ducted using JASP 0.8.1 (JASP team, 2016).
Experiment 1: Results
Figure 2 shows the accuracy and RT data in Experiment
1. Two 2 (Trial type: Match/mismatch) 3 3 (Person:
You/mother/stranger) ANOVAs were conducted, one
with accuracy as the dependent variable and the other
with RT as the dependent variable. Table 1 shows the
results of these ANOVAs, as well as relevant post hoc
contrasts/within-participant t-tests and the Cohen’s d
associated with each contrast.
In sum, for matching judgments, accuracy followed a
pattern self>mother> stranger (all ps< .001, all ds
>0.97, all BF10>100). On average, accuracy for match-
ing judgments about self was 18% higher than for
matching judgments about mother and stranger (size of
the self-bias5 .18, SD5 .11). In categorical terms, 119/
124 (96%) participants showed a self-bias in accuracy
for matching judgments. Likewise, RT followed a pat-
tern self<mother< stranger (all ps< .001, all ds >0.75,
all BF10>100). On average, RT for matching judgments
about self was 60ms faster than RT for matching judg-
ments about mother and stranger (size of the self-
bias520.06s, SD50.04). In categorical terms, 112/124
(90%) of participants showed a self-bias in RT for
matching judgments.
In contrast, for mismatching judgements, accuracy fol-
lowed a pattern self<mother< stranger (all ps< .003,
all ds >0.27, all BF10>7.08). Likewise, for mismatching
judgments, RT followed a pattern self5mother> -
stranger (all ps< .001, all ds >0.75, all BF10>100).
Thus, participants clearly showed a self-bias in accuracy
2The size of the self-bias was determined by subtracting average per-
formance (for both accuracy and RT) across the mother and stranger
conditions from performance in the self condition. An alternative
approach would have been to create two types of self-bias score [as
Lombardo et al., 2007, did]. For both accuracy and RT, self-bias could
have been indexed by calculating self minus mother, on the one hand
(self-bias 1), and self minus stranger, on the other hand (self-bias 2).
The disadvantage to this approach would be that it increases the num-
ber of statistical comparison necessary from 12 to 24, which would
have increased the risk of making Type I errors. Nonetheless, after a
suggestion from an anonymous reviewer, we conducted the additional
analyses post hoc. These revealed that—in keeping with our original
association analyses reported above—in Experiment 1, AQ was non-
significantly associated with either self-bias 1 for accuracy or RT
(rs< .04, ps> .64), or self-bias 2 for accuracy or RT (rs< .13, ps> .17).
Likewise, in Experiment 2, AQ was non-significantly associated with
either a) self-bias 1 for accuracy or RT in either ASD (rs<2.14, ps> .53)
or comparison participants (rs< .29, ps> .21), or b) self-bias 2 for accu-
racy or RT in either ASD (rs<2.14, ps> .52) or comparison participants
(rs< .27, ps> .23). Thus, no matter which way the self-bias score is cal-
culated, we found no evidence that it was associated with ASD features
or traits.
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and RT for matching trials, but not mismatching trials,
which replicates findings from Sui et al. [2012].3
Association Analyses
Correlation analyses were conducted to explore the size
of the self-bias for matching judgments in both accu-
racy and RT on the Shapes Task on the one hand, and
score on the AQ, on the other hand. AQ score was non-
significantly associated with both accuracy self-bias,
r5 .04, P50.65, BF1050.12, and RT self-bias, r5 .10,
P50.27, BF1050.21.
Experiment 1: Discussion
In Experiment 1, we replicated precisely the pattern of
results on the Shapes Task reported by Sui and col-
leagues [2012]. Participants were significantly faster and
more accurate at making perceptual matching judg-
ments about self than either stranger or mother. Most
importantly, however, correlation analyses indicated a
negligible and non-significant association between indi-
vidual differences in the number of ASD-like traits
(reported using the AQ) and the size of the self-bias in
both accuracy and RT. Bayesian correlation analyses
Figure 2. Accuracy and RTs from Experiment 1.
Table 1. ANOVA Results from Experiment 1
Effect F P g2p t-tests/contrasts Cohen’s d for contrasts
Accuracy Person 74.21 <.001 .38 Self>Mother> Stranger -
Trial type 0.12 .73 .001 Match5mismatch -
Person 3 Trial type 213.37 .001 .63 Matching trials
Self>Mother***e
0.97
Self> Stranger***e 1.70
Mother> Stranger***e 0.97
Mismatching trials
Self<Mother**d
0.30
Self< Stranger***e 0.54
Mother< Stranger**d 0.27
RT Person 85.04 .001 .41 Self<Mother< Stranger
Trial type 346.16 <.001 .74
Person 3 Trial type Matching trials
Self<Mother***e
0.99
Self< Stranger***e 1.46
Mother< Stranger***e 0.75
Mismatching trials Self5Mothera 0.01
Self> Stranger*b 0.22
Mother> Stranger**d 0.26
*P< 0.05; **P< 0.01; ***P< 0.001.
a BF10< 0.33; b BF105 0.34–0.99; c BF105 1–2.99; d BF105 3–99; e BF10> 100.
3There were no systematic differences between males and females in
terms of accuracy or RT on the Shapes task. The two ANOVAs reported
for Exp. 1 were reconducted but each including a sex variable. None of
the main or interaction effects involving Sex were significant or associ-
ated with anything other than a small effect size, all Fs<1.95, all
ps> .14, all g2p < :02: Thus, there were no significant differences
between males and females in terms of either overall level or patterns
of performance on the Shapes task.
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suggested that the data provided moderate to strong
evidence in favor of the null hypothesis. These findings
contrast with the findings of Grisdale et al. [2014] and
Henderson et al. [2009] who report significant associa-
tions between number of ASD traits and the size of the
self-bias in memory shown by participants on the own-
ership and trait memory paradigms, respectively. Given
that autism traits did not affect the extent to which
self-reference influenced perception among neurotypi-
cal individuals, it seems reasonable to predict that peo-
ple with a full diagnosis of ASD would show a typical
self-bias on the Shapes task. We tested this prediction
in Experiment 2.
Experiment 2: Method
Participants
Twenty-two adults with ASD and 21 neurotypical com-
parison adults took part. Participant groups were closely
matched for age and sex, and as VIQ, PIQ, and FSIQ
using the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale for Intelligence-II
[Wechsler, 1999; see Table 1]. Participants in the ASD
group had received verified diagnoses, according to con-
ventional criteria [American Psychiatric Association,
2000; World Health Organisation, 1993] and all com-
pleted the Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule
[ADOS; Lord et al., 2000].
Materials and Procedures
Participants from each group completed the Shapes
Task and AQ used in Experiment 1. In addition, two
mindreading measures were also completed by partici-
pants in Experiment 2:
Reading the Mind in the Eyes (RMIE) task
[Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, Martin, &
Clubley, 2001]. The RMIE is a widely used measure
of mindreading. Participants were presented with a
series of 36 photographs of the eye-region of the face.
On each trial, participants were asked to pick one word
from a selection of four to indicate what the person in
the picture was thinking/feeling. Scores ranged from a
possible 0–36, with higher scores indicating better
performance.
Animations Task [e.g., Abell, Happe, & Frith,
2000]. The task, which is based on Heider and Sim-
mel [1944], required participants to describe interac-
tions between a large red triangle and a small blue
triangle, as portrayed in a series of silent video clips.
Four clips were apt to invoke an explanation of the tri-
angles’ behavior in terms of epistemic mental states,
such as belief, intention, and deception. These clips
comprise the “mentalizing” condition of the task and
were employed in this study.
Each clip was presented to participants on a com-
puter screen. After the clip was finished, participants
described what had happened in the clip. An audio
recording of participants’ responses was made for later
transcription. Each transcription was scored on a scale
of 0–2 for accuracy (including reference to specific men-
tal states), based on the criteria outlined in Abell et al.
[2000]. Twenty percent of transcripts were also scored
by two independent raters. Inter-rater reliability across
all clips was excellent according to Cicchetti’s [1994]
criteria (intra-class correlation5 .85). Accuracy (propor-
tion) among ASD and comparison participants is shown
in Table 2.
Experiment 2: Results
Accuracy
Figure 3 shows the accuracy and RT data in each group
in Experiment 2. Two 2 (Group: ASD/neurotypical) 3 2
(Trial type: Match/mismatch) 3 3 (Person: You/mother/
stranger) ANOVAs were conducted, one with accuracy
as the dependent variable and the other with RT as the
dependent variable. Table 3 shows the results of these
ANOVAs, as well as post hoc contrasts/within-partici-
pant t-tests and the Cohen’s d associated with each rele-
vant contrast.
Just as in Exp. 1, a significant Trial type 3 person
interaction in each ANOVA indicated that both groups
of participants were showing a self-bias in accuracy and
RT for matching trials, but not mismatching trials.
Table 2. Baseline Characteristics among Participants in Experiment 2
ASD (n5 22; 18 male) NT (n5 21; 16 male) t P d
Age 35.84 (11.55) 36.32 (12.01) 20.13 0.89 0.04
VIQ 101.95 (15.31) 107.00 (9.79) 21.28 0.21 0.39
PIQ 101.27 (19.85) 106.43 (11.17) 21.04 0.30 0.32
FSIQ 101.41 (17.21) 107.10 (9.55) 21.33 0.19 0.41
AQ 31.41 (7.88) 16.19 (5.10) 7.48 <0.001 2.28
ADOS 10.91 (4.17) -
RMIE (proportion) .63 (.19) .78 (.10) 23.29 0.002 1.00
Animations (proportion) .52 (.28) .73 (.24) 22.62 0.012 0.80
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Crucially, no main or interaction effect involving
Group was significant in either ANOVA. Thus, there
were no significant differences between the groups in
terms of levels or patterns of performance (accuracy or
RT) on the Shapes task.
To be clear, accuracy of matching judgments about
self was significantly greater than either matching judg-
ments about mother or stranger among both partici-
pants with ASD, all ts>4.43, all ps< .001, all ds>0.95,
all BF10>100, and NT participants, ts>3.57, all ps< .003,
all ds>0.78, all BF10>20.76. On average, accuracy for
matching judgments about self was 20% higher than for
matching judgments about mother and stranger among
participants with ASD (size of the self-bias5 .20, SD5 .16)
and 21% higher among NT participants (size of the self-
bias5 .21, SD5 .16), a between-group difference that was
small and non-significant, t(41)50.30, P50.76, d50.09,
BF1050.31. In categorical terms, 19/22 (86%) participants
Figure 3. Accuracy and RTs from Experiment 2.
Table 3. ANOVA Results from Experiment 2
Effect F P g2p t-tests/contrasts Cohen’s d for contrasts
Accuracy Person 24.83 < 0.001 .38 Self>Mother>Stranger -
Trial type 3.05 0.09 .07 - -
Group 2.91 0.10 .07 - -
Person 3 Trial type 36.49 <0.001 .47 Matching trials
Self>Mother***e
0.87
Self> Stranger***e 1.30
Mother> Stranger***e 0.79
Mismatching trials
Self5Motherb
0.49
Self5 Strangerb 0.51
Mother5 Strangera 0.22
Group 3 Trial type 2.37 0.13 .06 - -
Group 3 Person 1.57 0.21 .04 - -
Group 3 Person 3 Trial type 0.55 0.58 .01 - -
RT Person 15.42 <0.001 .27 Self<Mother<Stranger -
Trial type 68.58 <0.001 .63 Match<Mismatch -
Group 0.86 0.36 .02 - -
Person 3 Trial type 36.95 <0.001 .47 Matching trials
Self<Mother**d
0.47
Self< Stranger***e 1.06
Mother< Stranger***e 1.03
Mismatching trials
Self5Mothera
0.03
Self5 Strangera 0.17
Mother5 Strangerb 0.30
Group 3 Trial type 2.93 0.10 .07 - -
Group 3 Person 0.79 0.46 .02 - -
Group 3 Person 3 trial type 0.14 0.75 <.01 - -
*P< 0.05; **P< 0.01; ***P< 0.001.
a BF10< 0.33; b BF105 0.34–0.99; c BF105 1–2.99; d BF105 3–99; e BF10> 100.
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with ASD and 19/21 (90%) of comparison participants
showed a self-bias in accuracy for matching judgments,
v250.18, Fisher’s exact P50.67, u5 .06.
Likewise, RTs were faster for matching judgments
about self than either mother or stranger among both
participants with ASD, all ts>2.17, all ps< .04, all
ds>0.46, all BF10>3.04, and NT participants, ts>2.12,
all ps< .05, all ds>0.46, all BF10>2.81. On average, RT
for matching judgments about self was 60ms faster
than RT for matching judgments about mother and
stranger among participants with ASD (size of the self-
bias50.06s, SD50.08) and 70ms faster among NT par-
ticipants (size of the self-bias50.07s, SD50.07), a
between-group difference that was small and non-
significant, t(42)50.44, P50.66, d50.13, BF1050.33.
In categorical terms, 17/22 (77%) participants with ASD
and 17/21 (81%) of comparison participants showed a
self-bias in RT for matching judgments, v250.09, Fish-
er’s exact P>0.99, u5 .04.
In contrast, accuracy of mismatching judgments
about self was non-significantly different from accuracy
of mismatching judgments about mother or stranger
among both participants with ASD, all ts<1.32, all
ps> .20, all ds<0.28, all BF10<0.48, and NT partici-
pants, all ts<0.90, all ps> .38, all ds<0.20, all
BF10<0.33. Likewise, RTs were not significantly faster
for mismatching judgments about self than either judg-
ments about mother or stranger among either partici-
pants with ASD, all ts<1.21, all ps> .23, all ds<0.26,
all BF10<0.21, or NT participants, all ts>0.49, all
ps> .63, all ds<0.11, all BF10<0.25.
4
Association Analyses
Correlation analyses were conducted in each group to
explore the size of the self-bias for matching judgments
in both accuracy and RT on the Shapes Task, on the
one hand, and score on the AQ (and ADOS), on the
other hand. Among ASD participants, AQ score was
non-significantly associated with either accuracy self-
bias, r52.10, P50.67, BF1050.29, or RT self-bias,
r52.08, P50.72, BF1050.28. Likewise, ADOS total
score was non-significantly associated with either accu-
racy self-bias, r<2.01, P50.99, BF1050.26, or RT self-
bias, r52.15, P50.50, BF1050.33. Finally, neither the
self-bias for accuracy or RT was associated with either
RMIE performance, rs<2.06, ps> .79, BF10<0.27, or Ani-
mations task performance, rs< .29, ps> .19, BF10<0.58.
Among NT participants, AQ score was non-significantly
associated with either accuracy self-bias, r5 .10, P50.66,
BF1050.30, or RT self-bias, r5 .20, P50.39, BF1050.39.
Also, neither the self-bias for accuracy or RT was associ-
ated with RMIE performance, rs< .26, ps> .25,
BF10<0.50. The association between accuracy and RT
self-biases, and Animations task performance were less
easy to interpret, however. The association between RT
self-bias and Animations task performance was moder-
ately positive (the larger the self-bias, the better the Ani-
mation task performance) and close to statistical
significance, r5 .41, P50.07, BF1051.32. The association
between accuracy self-bias and Animations task perfor-
mance was also moderate in size and close to statistical
significance, but this time the association was negative
(the smaller the self-bias, the better the Animation task
performance), r5 .39, P50.07, BF1051.13. Note that in
both cases, however, the Bayes Factor associated with the
associations indicated that the data were inconclusive.
Thus, number of ASD traits/severity of ASD features
was non-significantly related to either accuracy or RT
self-bias in either ASD or comparison participants.
Experiment 2: Discussion
The results from Experiment 2 dovetailed closely those
from Experiment 1; there was no hint of any significant
between-group (ASD/NT) differences in performance on
the Shapes Task. Both ASD and closely-matched NT
comparison participants showed an identical pattern of
performance across conditions of the Shapes task, show-
ing superior accuracy and faster RTs when making
matching judgments about self than about either
stranger or mother. The between-group difference in
the size of this self-bias was associated with a negligible
effect size and Bayesian analyses provided moderate-to-
strong evidence in favor of the null hypothesis with
respect to this difference. Moreover, in each group, the
size of the self-bias for matching judgments was equiva-
lent to that shown by the large sample of NT partici-
pants in Experiment 1, and the majority of participants
in both experiments showed self-bias for matching
judgments. In addition, replicating findings from Exper-
iment 1, number of ASD traits as indexed by score on
the AQ (or ADOS among ASD participants only) was
not significantly associated with either the accuracy or
RT self-bias for matching judgments in either group of
participants; Bayesian analyses again favored the null in
every case. Finally, there was no evidence for a reliable
association between size of the self-bias and
4Using d’, rather than accuracy, produces the same results as the pro-
portion accuracy scores employed in Experiment 2. A 2 (Group: ASD/
neurotypical) 3 3 (Person: You/mother/stranger) mixed ANOVA on d’
scores yielded a significant main effect of Person, F(2, 82)524.39,
P<0.001, g2p5 .37, reflecting a pattern of d’ self>d’ mother>d’
stranger among both groups of participants (all ts>4.06, all ps <.002,
all ds >.53, all BF10 >26.07). Neither the main effect of Group, F(1,
41)53.05, P50.17, g2p5 .05, nor the Group 3 person interaction effect
was significant, F(2, 82)51.64, P50.20, g2p5 .04. The size of the self-
bias in d’ scores was 0.66 (SD50.61) among participants with ASD and
0.70 (SD50.99) among NT participants, a difference between the
groups that was small and non-significant, t(41)50.13, P50.90,
d50.04, BF1050.30.
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mindreading ability. Performance on the RMIE task was
not significantly associated with either the accuracy or
RT self-bias in either ASD or comparison participants,
and the Bayesian analyses favored the null in every
case. Performance on the Animations task was moder-
ately associated with accuracy self-bias and RT self-bias,
but negatively so in the former case and positively so in
the latter. These contradictory direction of these associ-
ations and the fact that Bayesian analyses indicated
that the data were insensitive, as well as the number of
comparisons made (inflating the risk of type I error),
should lead to a high degree of caution when interpret-
ing these final analyses.
General Discussion
Findings from experiments 1 and 2 strongly suggest
that the extent to which self-reference influences per-
formance on the Shapes Task is unaffected by ASD or
ASD traits. This contrasts with findings from other stud-
ies that show the size of the self-bias on trait memory
and ownership paradigms is diminished in people with
ASD and predicted by ASD severity/number of ASD
traits. What could explain these contrasts?
One explanation is that self-representation is unim-
paired in ASD, but selectively blocked from influencing
memory. Certainly, the finding that perceptual binding
is enhanced by self-reference in ASD suggests that at
least some aspect of self-representation is unimpaired in
ASD. However, the suggestion that all aspects of self-
representation are unimpaired in ASD and merely
blocked from influencing memory is challenged by sev-
eral other findings. First, individuals with ASD show
impairments on some tests of self-representation that
do not involve memory [see Williams, 2010]. Second,
some types of self-bias in memory are undiminished
among people with this disorder. Specifically, people
with ASD are typical in showing superior memory for
their own actions relative to actions they have observed
another person make an “enactment effect” [e.g., Baker-
Ward, Hess, & Flannagan, 1990; Engelkamp, 1998].
Grainger, Williams, & Lind, 2014a,b] summarized results
across studies and showed that the memory advantage
for self-performed over observed actions was almost
identical in (n5239) people with ASD (10% advan-
tage) and (n5240) comparison individuals (11%
advantage).
The explanation for this range of findings across stud-
ies might lie in the type/level of self-representation that
underpins the self-bias on each of these different para-
digms. In the trait memory paradigm, participants
make judgments about whether trait words apply to
them (“Does ‘cheerful’ apply to me?”), which clearly
requires the formation of a second-order representation
of oneself. Thus, at the point of encoding the relevant
information in the trait memory paradigm, the self is
the object of thought (the “me” in James’ terms). In the
ownership paradigm, participants arguably have to
make a judgment about the owned (or non-owned) sta-
tus of objects at the point of encoding (“Is this object
mine?”). In contrast, in both the shapes and enactment
paradigms, no such second-order representation is
required. In the Shapes Task, participants have to make
a speeded perceptual judgment about whether or not
shape-label pairs match a learned contingency. In this
case, we suggest that a first-order representation of self
(i.e., the self as the subject of thought; the “I”, in James’
terms) is all that is required to bias accuracy and RT in
favor of self-relevant matches. No second-order reflec-
tion of the form, “Does ‘triangle’ match me?”, is
required to bias such perceptual judgments, we suggest.
Likewise, in traditional enactment paradigms, a partici-
pant performs a series of actions and also observes
another person performing a distinct set of actions,
after which memory for the actions is tested. There is
no obvious sense in which any participant capable of
basic action-monitoring needs to form a second-order
representation about whether or not they are perform-
ing the action. Again, the subjective self is all that is
required to bias information encoding in such circum-
stances [Grainger, Williams, & Lind, 2016a, 2016b].
This suggestion is consistent with evidence from neuro-
imaging studies that distinguish subjective from objec-
tive aspects of self. For example, Schmitz and Johnson
[2007] suggest that the ventro medial prefrontal cortex
(vmPFC) underpins pre-reflective orientating to/deci-
sions about self-relevant stimuli, whereas the dorsal
medial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC) contributes to con-
scious reflection on and evaluation of oneself. In this
context, it is important to note that the dmPFC has
been implicated in the self-bias on both the trait mem-
ory and ownership paradigms [Sui and Humphreys
2017; Turk, Van Bussel, Waiter, & Macrae, 2011], but
not the Shapes paradigm which relies instead on
vmPFC activation [see Sui & Humphreys, 2015]. More-
over, this distinction between ventral and medial sec-
tions of the PFC seems consistent with another
important “dissociation” in the current article, namely
between self-reference and mindreading. In Experiment
2, participants with ASD showed characteristic signifi-
cant impairments on two measures of mindreading,
despite showing the typical SRE on the Shapes Task.
Importantly, the dmPFC is a core component of the
network of brain regions that underpins mindreading
[e.g., Isoda & Noritake, 2013] and, early in life, supports
specifically the kind of triadic joint attention that is an
early manifestation of (or perhaps precursor to) mind-
reading [e.g., Grossman & Johnson, 2007; Mundy,
2009], all of which this is consistent with the argument
INSAR Williams et al./Self-reference effect on perception 339
that only certain forms of self-reference are linked to
social-cognitive abilities more generally.
If our interpretation is correct, then this suggests that
only second-order representations of self (the “me”) are
atypical/impoverished among people with ASD. Cer-
tainly, this is in keeping with findings that metacogni-
tive monitoring (i.e., diminished second-order/meta-
representation of one’s cognitive activity) is impaired in
ASD [e.g., Grainger et al., 2014a, b, Williams,
Bergstr€om, & Grainger, 2016]. However, an alternative
possibility (suggested by an anonymous reviewer) is
that participants with ASD showed an undiminished
self-bias on the Shapes Task because the stimuli was
devoid of any emotional content. On the traditional
trait memory paradigm, described above, participants
make judgments about whether emotionally-valanced
adjectives apply to themselves or others, whereas the
label-shape associations in the Shapes Task appear
emotionally-neutral. Given this, it may be that the
diminished self-reference effect on the trait memory
paradigm (and ownership paradigm), but undiminished
self-reference effect on the Shapes Task (and action
monitoring tasks), reflects the different emotional
demands inherent to each type of task.
These two possibilities could be tested directly by
(among other means) comparing performance of indi-
viduals with ASD on a test of self-referential memory
that requires explicit judgments to be made about self
with a test in which encoding of self-related informa-
tion is only implicit or incidental to the task at hand
[e.g., Cunningham et al., 2014]. If only second-order
self-representations are diminished in ASD, then ASD-
specific impairments should be expected on the explicit
evaluative task only. In contrast, if the root of the
diminished self-reference effects in ASD is a difficulty
with emotion-processing, then even the self-bias should
be diminished among people with ASD on both the
incidental/implicit and explicit versions of the trait
memory task, because both involve the self-referential
processing of emotionally-valanced adjectives. Regard-
less, the current results suggest strongly that perceptual
binding is supported by self-reference in ASD just as it is
in typical development. These findings inform theories of
perception, as well as self-awareness, in ASD, and suggest
an important dissociation between self-referential process-
ing and social cognition more generally.
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